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HUTCHINSON, Circuit Judge. 
 
 
 Appellants, the Presbytery of New Jersey of the 
Orthodox Presbyterian Church ("Presbytery"), the Calvary Orthodox 
Presbyterian Church of Wildwood ("Calvary") and Reverend David B. 
 
 
Cummings ("Cummings"), a clergyman of the Orthodox Presbyterian 
denomination (collectively "plaintiffs"), appeal an order of the 
district court dismissing their complaint.1  Plaintiffs assert 
recent amendments to the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination 
(the "LAD" or "Act"), N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 10:5-1 to 10:5-42 (West 
1993 & Supp. 1994), violate the First Amendment right to freedom 
of speech.  The amendments they question added to the category of 
impermissible distinctions "affectional or sexual orientation" to 
the statute's ban on certain forms of discrimination.  Relying on 
a responsible state official's affidavit that the state would not 
enforce the LAD against Calvary or Presbytery as churches or 
Cummings as a church pastor, the district court held that the 
case was not ripe. 
 We conclude, however, that the controversy is ripe 
because Cummings arguably alleges the statute threatens his right 
as an individual citizen to speak out against male and female 
homosexual acts and the state has expressly refused to offer any 
assurance it will not prosecute Cummings if he does so outside 
his church.  The same, however, is not true of the institutional 
church plaintiffs, Presbytery and Calvary.  Accordingly, we will 
reverse the district court's order and remand for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion in so far as its order 
                     
1.  The caption in this case lists James Florio as the Governor 
of New Jersey.  After it was filed, Christine Todd Whitman was 
elected to that office, but there has not yet been a substitution 
of parties.  The failure to amend the caption in this respect 
does not affect this appeal.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d)(1).  We 
note the change for purposes of clarification only. 
 
 
applies to Reverend Cummings.  We will, however affirm the 
district court's dismissal without prejudice of this action as it 
pertains to the institutional plaintiffs. 
 
 I. 
 In April 1992, the plaintiffs brought this suit to 
enjoin enforcement of recent amendments to the LAD which had 
added "affectional or sexual orientation" to the personal traits 
or characteristics generally protected against discrimination in 
public accommodations,2 employment and housing.  See N.J. Stat. 
Ann. §§ 10:5-4, 10:5-12 (West Supp. 1994).  The statute also 
prohibits "aid[ing], abet[ting], incit[ing], compel[ing] or 
coerc[ing]" others into violations of its prohibitions against 
discrimination.  N.J. Stat. Ann. § 10:5-12(e); see N.J. Stat. 
Ann. § 10:5-12(n).  The plaintiffs originally challenged these 
and other provisions as an infringement on the First Amendment 
right to the free exercise of religion and association as well as 
the right to freedom of speech.  On May 15, 1992, they filed a 
motion for a preliminary injunction and on May 22, filed an 
amended complaint.  On June 11, 1992, the state filed a motion 
for summary judgment along with a motion for dismissal.  The 
district court heard oral argument but denied the motion for a 
preliminary injunction holding that the plaintiffs failed to 
                     
2.  Public accommodations are defined quite broadly in N.J. Stat. 
Ann. § 10:5-5(l).  They include, but are not limited to, taverns, 
hotels, trailer camps, day camps, health facilities, stores and 
other retail establishments, restaurants, public conveyances, 
movie theaters, pool halls, schools, etc.  See id. 
 
 
establish both a likelihood of success on the merits and 
irreparable harm.  The plaintiffs appealed to this Court and on 
December 14, 1992, we affirmed the district court in an 
unpublished memorandum opinion.  Presbytery of New Jersey v. 
Florio, No. 92-5339, slip. op. at 13 (3d Cir. Dec. 14, 1992) 
("Presbytery I"), see 983 F.2d 1052 (3d Cir. 1992) (Table).  
Because of the state's affidavit stating its intention not to 
enforce the Act against religious institutions, we held that the 
plaintiffs failed to demonstrate the possibility of immediate and 
irreparable harm.  Id. at 9-10.  We also held that the 
possibility of private enforcement of the Act by activist 
homosexual groups was too remote to constitute an immediate 
threat of potential harm and, in any event, the private parties 
would not be bound by the injunction sought.  Id. at 10-12.  We 
specifically refused to comment on the district court's 
discussion of the plaintiffs' likelihood of success on the 
merits.  Id. at 13. 
 Following our decision, the district court heard 
argument on the state's Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss.  The 
state argued that the plaintiffs lacked standing, the case was 
not ripe and that the federal court should abstain under Railroad 
Commission of Texas v. Pullman, 312 U.S. 496 (1941).  The 
district court granted the state's motion and dismissed the 
complaint.  Presbytery of New Jersey v. Florio, 830 F. Supp. 241 
(D.N.J. 1993) ("Presbytery II").  It held that the case was not 
ripe, based on the state's affidavit that it would not enforce 
the Act against the institutional plaintiffs as churches or 
 
 
Cummings in his capacity as a clergyman of the Orthodox 
Presbyterian Church.  Id. at 248-50.3  The plaintiffs filed a 
timely notice of appeal. 
 
 II. 
 The LAD, originally enacted in 1945, prohibits 
discrimination in employment, labor organization membership, 
public accommodations and real estate, financial, and business 
transactions.  In 1991, the New Jersey legislature added 
"affectional or sexual orientation" to the personal 
characteristics of race, creed, color, national origin, ancestry, 
age, sex, and marital status previously protected.4  Under the 
                     
3.  The court did not reach the issue of standing or Pullman 
abstention. 
4.  The legislature's finding and declaration states: 
 
  The Legislature finds and declares that 
practices of discrimination against any of 
its inhabitants, because of . . . affectional 
or sexual orientation . . . [is a] matter[] 
of concern to the government of the State, 
and that such discrimination threatens not 
only the rights and proper privileges of the 
inhabitants of the State but menaces the 
institutions and foundation of a free 
democratic State . . . . 
 
  . . . 
 
  The Legislature further finds that 
because of discrimination, people suffer 
personal hardships, and the State suffers a 
grievous harm. . . .  The Legislature intends 
that such damages be available to all persons 
protected by this act and that this act shall 
be liberally construed in combination with 




Act, it is unlawful for an employer "to refuse to hire or employ 
or to bar or to discharge or require to retire" any individual on 
the basis of a protected characteristic.  Id. § 10:5-12(a).  The 
Act also prohibits the printing or circulating of any statement 
which expresses, directly or indirectly, that employment 
opportunities for persons with the protected characteristics will 
be limited.  Id. § 10:5-12(c).  Public accommodations are 
similarly restrained.  See id. § 10:5-12(f).  In addition, the 
LAD makes it illegal for any individual to refuse to transact 
business with individual groups who have any of the protected 
characteristics.  Id. §§ 10:5-12(l), (m).  The Act also makes it 
illegal "to aid, abet, incite, compel or coerce the doing of any 
of the acts forbidden under this act, or to attempt to do so."  
Id. § 10:5-12(e).  Still another section applying the Act's 
prohibition against aiding, abetting, inciting or coercing 
violations of subsection (l) and (m) specifically prohibits 
incitements to boycott persons who belong to the protected 
groups.  Id. § 10:5-12(n)(2).  Finally, the Act requires owners 
of public accommodations and employers to post public notices 
informing employees and patrons of their rights under the Act.  
Id. § 10:5-12(j). 
 The Act exempts religious organizations from compliance 
in the selection of their own employees and it permits religious 
organizations to restrict rental or use of their own property to 
(..continued) 
 
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 10:5-3 (West Supp. 1994). 
 
 
members of their own faith.  Id. §§ 10:5-12(a), 10:5-5(n).  The 
Act does not apply to private clubs or facilities for religious 
education.  Id. § 10:5-5(l). 
 The state itself may enforce the Act's civil penalties 
against violators.  An aggrieved individual may begin the process 
of civil enforcement by filing a complaint with the state 
Division on Civil Rights ("DCR") or proceeding directly to state 
court.  Id. § 10:5-13 (West 1993).  The Act specifically grants 
standing to sue to "[a]ny individual who has been discriminated 
against" and "any organization which represents or acts to 
further the interests of individuals who have been discriminated 
against."  Id. § 10:5-38 (West 1993).  The successful plaintiff 
may recover compensatory and punitive damages, fines, and 
attorney fees.  Id. § 10:5-3; id. § 10:5-14.1a (West 1993); id. 
§ 10:5-27.1 (West 1993).  The Act is to be liberally construed to 
accomplish its purpose of eradicating the kinds of discrimination 
it prohibits.  See id. § 10:5-3. 
 The Orthodox Presbyterian Church ("OPC") is a national 
denomination with 170 member churches, including Calvary.  The 
OPC split from the Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.) in 1936 over a 
doctrinal difference.5  Presbytery is a New Jersey religious 
corporation and the formal governing body of OPC churches in New 
                     
5.  The Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.) as well as a number of other 
mainstream organized religions have filed a joint amicus brief 
setting out their opposition to OPC's doctrinal views and 
teachings.  These amici support the state's position on the 
merits of this case.  Because we are only concerned with 
jurisdiction on this appeal we do not decide the merits. 
 
 
Jersey.  At the time plaintiffs initially filed their complaint, 
the OPC had 2,113 members in New Jersey. 
 In their complaint, the plaintiffs allege the 
following.  Based upon The Holy Bible and church doctrine, the 
OPC teaches that homosexuality, bisexuality, and heterosexual sex 
outside of marriage are grievous sins.  Plaintiffs also allege 
that they 
 have always in the past, presently do and 
since the 1992 amendments, have directly or 
indirectly discriminated against and made 
reasonable distinctions based upon 
homosexuality, bisexuality and heterosexual 
sex outside of marriage.  For example, in New 
Jersey the plaintiffs express, speak and 
preach against homosexuality, adultery and 
fornication, calling it variously an 
abomination and sinful. . . .  They also 
disseminate and circulate such speech and 
distinctions throughout New Jersey and the 
world. . . .  [T]hey even print and 
disseminate materials condemning sexual 
sins. . . .  Plaintiffs, and their members, 
also inquire about the sexual practices of 
prospective employees and are continuing to 




Complaint ¶ 49, Appellants' Appendix ("App.") at 217.  Cummings 
and members of his congregation "speak out about homosexuality, 
bisexuality and heterosexual sex outside of marriage, make 
reasonable distinctions based on such practices, lobby against 
them, and circulate literature condemning them.  They encourage, 
aid and abet discrimination and reasonable distinctions against 
homosexuals, bisexuals and heterosexuals engaging in sex outside 
of marriage."  Id. ¶ 51, App. at 217-18.  Furthermore, 
 
 
"[p]laintiffs have always in the past, presently do and since the 
amendments have refused to knowingly buy from, contract with or 
otherwise do business with persons on the basis of that person's 
homosexual, bisexual or heterosexual practices."  Id. ¶ 57, App. 
at 220.  Plaintiffs also "have always in the past, presently do 
and since the amendments have refused to employ any individual 
who is practicing any public sexual sin, including fornication, 
adultery and homosexuality, and they make reasonable distinctions 
based on such acts."  Id. ¶ 69, App. at 223. 
 Initially, plaintiffs contended that various elements 
of the Act violated their First, Fifth, Ninth and Fourteenth 
Amendment rights.  The allegedly offending sections included:  
sections 10:5-12(a) and (c) (applicable to employers); section 
10:5-12(f) (applicable to public accommodations); sections 10:5-
12(e) and (n) (prohibition against aiding, abetting, or inciting 
violations); section 10:5-12(j) (notice posting provision); and 
sections 10:5-12(l) and (m) (prohibition of boycotts and refusal 
to do business). 
 In response to plaintiffs' initial request for a 
preliminary injunction, the Director of the DCR, C. Gregory 
Stewart, filed an affidavit setting forth the DCR's and attorney 
general's position on enforcement of the Act against religious 
institutions.  The Stewart affidavit averred that the state did 
not consider churches places of "public accommodations."  Thus, 
the sections relating to public accommodations were inapplicable 
to the institutional plaintiffs.  Stewart further stated that 
 
 
churches were considered exempt in their hiring of internal 
employees.  Due to "First Amendment concerns," 
 the Division has not in the past prosecuted 
and has no intention to prosecute [under 
sections 10:5-12(c), (e), (f), (j), (l) & 
(m)] essentially exempt churches for 
sincerely-held religious belief or practice, 
or speech consistent with such belief, or for 
a refusal to engage in certain speech or for 
following their religious tenets . . . .  
Hence, the Division would not even attempt to 
enforce those provisions in the circumstances 
of sincerely-held religious reasons such as 
plaintiffs express here. . . . 
 
 
App. at 296.  Stewart also made the following general statement: 
  [I]t has been the consistent 
construction and interpretation of the LAD 
that, consonant with constitutional legal 
barriers respecting legitimate belief and 
free exercise protected by the First 
Amendment, the State was not authorized to 
regulate or control religious worship, 
beliefs, governance, practice or liturgical 
norms, even where ostensibly or colorably at 
odds with any of the LAD prohibited 
categories of discrimination. 
 
  . . . 
  
 Moreover, the Division has not and has no 
intention to engage in any determination or 
judgment as to what is or is not a "religious 
activity" of a church, or to determine what 
is or is not a "tenet" of religious faith.  
Within First Amendment limits, all of 
plaintiffs' claimed religiously-based free 
exercises of faith are unthreatened by a 
reasoned construction of the LAD consistent 




App. at 294-96.  The affidavit did not, however, disavow 
enforcement against the members of the church for their public 
 
 
activities nor does it preclude enforcement against Cummings for 
his activities outside the Church. 
 In light of the Stewart affidavit and our prior 
decision in Presbytery I, the parties agree that the scope of 
their challenge on the merits to the Act has been significantly 
limited.  The plaintiffs now challenge only section 10:5-12(e), 
which makes it illegal "to aid, abet, incite, compel or coerce" 
forbidden acts, section 10:5-12(n), which makes it illegal "to 
aid, abet, incite, compel, coerce or induce" boycotts or refusals 
to do business and section 10:5-12(j), the notice posting 
provision.  Presbytery II, 830 F. Supp. at 247; Brief of 
Appellants at 6.  Plaintiffs argue that the first two sections 
are impermissible restrictions on freedom of speech and the last 
provision is a violation of the freedom of conscience and forced 
speech.  Before the district court, however, the plaintiffs 
conceded that in light of the representations of the DCR, the 
sections have no applicability to the institutional plaintiffs 
Presbytery and Calvary.  Id. 
 
 III. 
 If this case is ripe, and if any of the plaintiffs have 
standing to assert their free speech claim, the district court 
would have subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1331, 
1343 (West 1993) and 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 2201, 2202 (West 1994).  The 
state contends, however, that the district court lacked 
jurisdiction because the plaintiffs did not present an 
Article III justiciable controversy.  The district court agreed 
 
 
and dismissed the case on this ground.  Because the district 
court did not reach the merits of the plaintiffs' claim, the 
dismissal was without prejudice.6  The district court's order is, 
however, a final resolution of the plaintiffs' claims and 
therefore we have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A. 
§ 1291 (West 1993). 
 Our review of ripeness and standing determinations is 
plenary.  Taylor Inv. Ltd. v. Upper Darby Township, 983 F.2d 
1285, 1289 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 304 (1993); Roe v. 
Operation Rescue, 919 F.2d 857, 863 (3d Cir. 1990). 
 
 IV. 
 The issue on this appeal is whether the plaintiffs have 
presented a ripe controversy so that an Article III court may 
assert jurisdiction.  We examine the merits of the claim only to 
the extent necessary to determine whether there is any potential 
for immediacy of harm. 
 Federal courts may only resolve actual "cases" and 
"controversies."  See U.S. Const. art. III, § 2.  The existence 
of a case and controversy is a prerequisite to all federal 
                     
6.  Generally, when a district court dismisses a case without 
prejudice, it is not a final order unless the party seeking 
appeal has specifically elected to stand on the complaint as set 
forth.  See generally Borelli v. City of Reading, 532 F.2d 950, 
951-52 (3d Cir. 1976) (per curiam).  In a case such as this where 
the district court has dismissed based on justiciability and it 
appears that the plaintiffs could do nothing to cure their 
complaint, the principle of Borelli does not apply.  Cf. Green v. 
Humphrey Elevator and Truck Co., 816 F.2d 877, 878 n.4 (3d Cir. 
1987) (dismissal without prejudice does not destroy finality 
where party cannot cure defect). 
 
 
actions, including those for declaratory or injunctive relief.  
See Cardinal Chem. Co. v. Morton Int'l, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 1967, 
1974 (1993); Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 
667, 671 (1950).  "Concerns of justiciability go to the power of 
the federal courts to entertain disputes, and to the wisdom of 
their doing so.  We presume that federal courts lack jurisdiction 
'unless "the contrary appears affirmatively from the record."'"  
Renne v. Geary, 501 U.S. 312, 316 (1991) (quoting Bender v. 
Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 546 (1986) (quoting 
King Bridge Co. v. Otoe County, 120 U.S. 225, 226 (1887))). 
 The concepts of standing and ripeness are related.  
Each is a component of the Constitution's limitation of the 
judicial power to real cases and controversies.  Correct analysis 
in terms of ripeness tells us when a proper party may bring an 
action and analysis in terms of standing tells us who may bring 
the action.  See Armstrong World Indus., Inc. v. Adams, 961 F.2d 
405, 411 & nn. 12-13 (3d Cir. 1992); see also Erwin Chemerinsky, 
Federal Jurisdiction 99 (1989) ("standing focuses on whether the 
type of injury alleged is qualitatively sufficient to fulfill the 
requirements of Article III and whether the plaintiff has 
personally suffered that harm, whereas ripeness centers on 
whether that injury has occurred yet").  Because these concepts 
are so closely related, they can be confused or conflated.  "It 
is sometimes argued that standing is about who can sue while 
ripeness is about when they can sue, though it is of course true 
that if no injury has occurred, the plaintiff can be told either 
that she cannot sue, or that she cannot sue yet."  Smith v. 
 
 
Wisconsin Dep't of Agriculture, Trade & Consumer Protection, 23 
F.3d 1134, 1141 (7th Cir. 1994) (emphasis in original).  It is 
the plaintiff's responsibility to allege facts that invoke the 
court's jurisdiction.  Renne, 501 U.S. at 316. 
 The district court did not reach the issue of standing 
but focused on whether any of the plaintiffs presented a ripe 
controversy.7  Ripeness prevents courts from "entangling 
themselves in abstract disagreements."  Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 
387 U.S. 136, 148 (1967).  "[R]uling on federal constitutional 
matters in advance of the necessity of deciding them [is to be 
avoided], to postpone judicial review where it would be 
premature."  Armstrong, 961 F.2d at 413.  The ripeness 
determination "evaluate[s] both the fitness of the issues for 
judicial decision and the hardship to the parties of withholding 
court consideration."  Abbott Labs., 387 U.S. at 149.  
Ultimately, the case must involve "'a real and substantial 
controversy admitting of specific relief through a decree of a 
conclusive character, as distinguished from an opinion advising 
what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts.'"  
North Carolina v. Rice, 404 U.S. 244, 246 (1971) (quotation 
omitted).  "A federal court's jurisdiction therefore can be 
                     
7.  The district court did opine, however, that "even if the 
Church's members were parties, nothing in the record indicates 
any realistic threat that the state will enforce the amendments 
against them."  Presbytery II, 830 F. Supp. at 249.  That 
conclusion is open to doubt considering the state's refusal to 
negate in its affidavit an intention to enforce the statute 
against members of the Orthodox Presbyterian denomination in 
their secular activities. 
 
 
invoked only when the plaintiff himself has suffered 'some 
threatened or actual injury resulting from the putatively illegal 
action . . . .'"  Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975) 
(citation omitted). 
 As Professor Chemerinsky recognizes, "[r]ipeness 
properly should be understood as involving the question of when 
may a party seek preenforcement review of a statute or 
regulation."  Chemerinsky, supra, at 100 (emphasis in original).  
Thus, it is not surprising that the ripeness inquiry often 
involves declaratory actions which present special problems.  See 
Maryland Casualty Co. v. Pacific Coal & Oil Co., 312 U.S. 270 273 
(1941) ("Basically, the question in each case is whether the 
facts alleged, under all the circumstances, show that there is a 
substantial controversy, between parties having adverse legal 
interests, of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the 
issuance of a declaratory judgment."). 
 We have adopted a three part test in determining 
whether we will engage in preenforcement review in the context of 
a declaratory action; specifically, we examine "the adversity of 
the interest of the parties, the conclusiveness of the judicial 
judgment and the practical help, or utility, of that judgment."  
Step-Saver Data Sys., Inc. v. Wyse Tech., 912 F.2d 643, 647 (3d 
Cir. 1990); see also Armstrong, 961 F.2d. at 412-24 (applying 
test while noting that factors are not exclusive). 
 On the first part, adversity of interest, we have 
observed, "'[f]or there to be an actual controversy[,] the 
defendant must be so situated that the parties have adverse legal 
 
 
interests.'"  Step-Saver, 912 F.2d at 648 (quoting 10A Charles 
Wright, Arthur Miller & Mary Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure 
§ 2757, at 582-83 (2d ed. 1983)).  Although the party seeking 
review need not have suffered a "completed harm" to establish 
adversity of interest, Armstrong, 961 F.2d at 412, it is 
necessary that there be a substantial threat of real harm and 
that the threat "must remain 'real and immediate' throughout the 
course of the litigation."  Salvation Army v. Department of 
Community Affairs, 919 F.2d 183, 192 (3d Cir. 1990).  Thus, where 
intervening events remove the possibility of harm, "the court 
must not address the now-speculative controversy."  Id.; see also 
Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & 
Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 201 (1983) (threatened injury must be 
"certainly impending"). 
 Second, the parties must not only retain adverse 
interests throughout the litigation, but "[a]ny contest must be 
based on a 'real and substantial controversy admitting of 
specific relief through a decree of a conclusive character, as 
distinguished from an opinion advising what the law would be upon 
a hypothetical state of facts.'"  Step-Saver, 912 F.2d at 649 
(quoting Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 241 
(1937)).  "A declaratory judgment granted in the absence of a 
concrete set of facts would itself be a 'contingency,' and 
applying it to actual controversies which subsequently arise 
would be an 'exercise in futility.'"  Armstrong, 961 F.2d at 412 
(quoting Step-Saver, 912 F.2d at 648).  The requirement of 
concreteness has some play in the joints.  We have noted, "the 
 
 
need for a concrete set of facts is greater in some instances 
than others."  Id.  For example, an "actual factual setting" is 
"particularly important in cases raising allegations of an 
unconstitutional taking," id. (quoting Hodel v. Virginia Surface 
Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 294-95 (1981)), whereas 
facts are not so important where the question is "predominantly 
legal."  Id. (quoting Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 461 U.S. at 201). 
 The third part of the test, utility of the judgment, is 
important because "[o]ne of the primary purposes behind the 
Declaratory Judgment Act was to enable plaintiffs to preserve the 
status quo . . ., and a case should not be considered justiciable 
unless 'the court is convinced that [by its action] a useful 
purpose will be served.'"  Step-Saver, 912 F.2d at 649 (quoting 
E. Borchard, Declaratory Judgments 29, 58 (1941)).  Thus, with 
these three inquiries in mind, we turn to an analysis of whether 
the district court erred by determining this case did not present 
a ripe controversy. 
 
 1.  Adversity of interest 
 In Armstrong we said, "[w]here the plaintiff's action 
is based on a contingency, it is unlikely that the parties' 
interest will be sufficiently adverse to give rise to a case or 
controversy within the meaning of Article III."  Armstrong, 961 
F.2d at 411-12.  In concluding that the instant case was not ripe 
for adjudication, the district court relied in large part on the 
representations of the DCR through the Stewart affidavit and a 
history of the LAD's non-enforcement against religiously 
 
 
motivated speakers.  Thus, in terms of the Step-Saver test, the 
district court determined that the parties had no adverse 
interest.  Despite Cummings' assertion that he has engaged, does 
engage and will engage in prohibited discrimination, the court 
stated: 
 [N]o enforcement action or private suit has 
been commenced against [Cummings or the other 
plaintiffs] as a result.  Moreover, although 
Plaintiffs allege that they intend to engage 
in similar conduct in the future, without an 
actual or imminent threat of enforcement of 
the statute the constitutional issues are not 
presented in a sufficiently "'clean-cut and 
concrete form'" to render this action ripe.'"  
See [Renne], 111 S. Ct. at 2339. 
 
  Plaintiffs argue that this case is ripe 
because, although Defendants have conceded 
that they will not enforce the LAD against 
the institutional plaintiffs, they have not 
waived enforcement of the statute against 
Cummings or against the Church's individual 
members.  The Court, however, disagrees with 
Plaintiffs' interpretation of Defendants' 
waiver as not including a waiver of 
enforcement against Cummings.  The 
Defendants, recognizing the First Amendment 
concerns raised in this action, have 
represented that the LAD does not apply to 
and will not be enforced against Plaintiffs' 
religious worship, beliefs, practice, speech 
or refusal to speak.  See Stewart Aff., 
¶¶ 10-13.  This Court reads these statements 
as clearly including Plaintiff Cummings.  
Accordingly, the Court sees no possibility of 
state enforcement against him. 
 
 
Presbytery II, 830 F. Supp. at 248-49. 
 The state argues that the district court correctly held 
that none of the named plaintiffs face an imminent threat that 
the LAD's prohibitions against incitement or otherwise inducing 
 
 
or helping others to induce boycotts, any of its other 
prohibitions against discrimination or its notice posting 
requirement will be enforced against them.  In support, the state 
contends that the complaint and its allegations refer to Cummings 
only in his capacity as pastor of an Orthodox Presbyterian 
Church.  Because it has waived enforcement against the plaintiffs 
when they act in their capacity as religious organizations or as 
clergymen performing religious functions, the state concludes 
that Cummings does not face any imminent threat of enforcement, 
but yet refuses to guarantee that he will not be prosecuted if he 
acts as an individual outside the church. 
 Applying the usual standards for construing the 
allegations of a complaint which give the plaintiff the benefit 
of all favorable inferences that can be drawn from them,8 we 
conclude that the complaint fairly asserts Reverend Cummings' 
rights as both a pastor and a citizen and therefore that the 
Stewart affidavit is insufficient to remove the threat of 
enforcement against Cummings in his individual capacity. 
 In order to determine what rights Cummings asserts, we 
turn to the amended complaint.  Complaints need not be models of 
precise information.  Rather, a complaint suffices when it serves 
fairly to notify the defendants of the facts and the alleged 
deprivation.  See, e.g., Holder v. City of Allentown, 987 F.2d 
188, 194 (3d Cir. 1993).  Moreover, when judged on their face, 
                     
8.  See Markowitz v. Northeast Land Company, 906 F.2d 100, 103 
(3d Cir. 1990). 
 
 
complaints should be construed in favor of the party defending 
against a motion to dismiss.  Cf. id. ("The test in reviewing a 
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim is whether, under 
any reasonable reading of the pleadings, plaintiff may be 
entitled to relief.") (citing Colburn v. Upper Darby Township, 
838 F.2d 663, 665-66 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1065 
(1989)); Williams v. New Castle County, 970 F.2d 1260, 1266 (3d 
Cir. 1992). 
 The state contends that the complaint asserts Cummings' 
rights only in terms of his institutional capacity.  A careful 
review of the record, however, reveals a different conclusion.  
Although it is helpful for a complaint to specify if a party is 
bringing suit in his individual or official capacity, we are not 
aware of any rigid rule that requires an express statement of 
such capacity.  We recognize that Cummings is listed as the "Rev. 
David B. Cummings" in the caption of the complaint, App. at 195, 
but his participation is nowhere limited to his institutional 
capacity.9  Again, in paragraph 4 of the complaint, Cummings is 
identified as being an ordained minister of the Presbytery, the 
pastor of one of its New Jersey churches and a plaintiff, but no 
                     
9.  Use of the term "Reverend" in written documents is generally 
a respectful acknowledgment of the clergyman's calling or 
profession.  In the same way persons in other professions are 
respectfully addressed as "doctor," "attorney," "professor," etc.  
At oral argument, appellants' counsel stated he listed Cummings 
as the "Rev. David B. Cummings" in the caption "because that is 
his title."  Transcript of Oral Argument, March 25, 1994 ("Tr.") 
at 5.  He also indicated that if a pastor is suing in an official 
capacity he normally would add "as pastor of such and such" in 
the caption.  Id. 
 
 
mention is made of his suing only as a leader of an institution.  
In paragraph 14, Cummings is described without limitation to his 
capacity as a clergyman or religious leader.  In paragraph 51, 
the complaint states: 
  Plaintiff Cummings, other pastors and 
members of their congregations . . . do speak 
out about homosexuality, bisexuality and 
heterosexual sex outside of marriage, make 
reasonable distinctions based on such 
practices, lobby against them, and circulate 
literature condemning them.  They encourage, 
aid and abet discrimination and reasonable 
distinctions against homosexuals, bisexuals 




App. at 218.  Paragraph 53 of the complaint alleges: 
 [P]laintiffs publish, circulate, issue, 
display, post and mail printed material 
condemning homosexuality, bisexuality and 
heterosexual sex outside of marriage, making 
reasonable distinctions based on such acts 
. . . . 
 
 
Id.  Paragraph 57 of the complaint alleges: 
  Plaintiffs have always in the past, 
presently do and since the amendments have 
refused to knowingly buy from, contract with 
or otherwise do business with persons on the 
basis of that person's homosexual, bisexual 
or heterosexual practices. 
 
 
Id. at 220.  None of these allegations limit the acts Cummings 
avers he wishes to perform without fear of prosecution or 
reprisal under the LAD to acts he would perform only as a pastor 
of the OPC.  Rather, the clear implication of these allegations, 
when we construe them in favor of the plaintiff, as we must, is 
 
 
that Cummings has in the past, currently does and in the future 
will engage in conduct both in his professional and personal life 
that could run afoul of the statute.  We see nothing in the 
complaint that would support the state's conclusion that Cummings 
asserts only his right to preach and teach within the confines of 
the church as a clergyman or religious leader.  To the contrary, 
the portions of the complaint just quoted indicate that Cummings, 
as an individual, plans to engage in conduct that has a potential 
for violating the LAD's ban on incitement of prohibited 
discrimination against male or female homosexuals in employment, 
commerce and places of public accommodation by boycott or 
otherwise.10  Thus, provided that a threat of enforcement 
                     
10.  In an affidavit submitted in support of his opposition to 
summary judgment, Cummings specifically reaffirmed certain 
paragraphs of the complaint.  He omitted, however, paragraphs 
alleging the intention to engage in prohibited conduct outside 
the church.  The state argues that this omission indicates that 
Cummings does not intend to engage in such conduct outside the 
institutional setting therefore removing the possibility of 
prosecution. 
 
    We do not think that Cummings' failure to specifically 
reference the relevant paragraphs of the complaint is tantamount 
to a disavowal of their content.  If, during the pendency of the 
litigation, Cummings were to disavow his intention to engage in 
proscribed conduct, that disavowal could deprive this case of 
ripeness.  See Salvation Army, 919 F.2d at 192.  At this 
preliminary juncture, however, we are advised Cummings intends to 
prove at trial the allegations contained in the complaint.  At 
oral argument this intention was reiterated by his counsel, 
speaking as an officer of the court.  Absent strong indications 
that the allegations of the complaint have been disavowed, we are 
reluctant to hold a first amendment freedom of expression claim 
is not ripe when the complaint adequately alleges that claim, 
without considering Cummings' standing to assert the chilling 
affect of the statute's prohibitions on freedom of expression, 




restricting Cummings' First Amendment right of free speech 
exists, the controversy would be ripe.  Focusing solely on the 
question of ripeness, however, it would not be sufficient for the 
complaint merely to assert Cummings' rights as a citizen.  There 
must remain a credible threat of enforcement against him even 
though representations were made by the state in its affidavit 
disclaiming any intention to enforce the statute against 
religious institutions. 
 We have held that "[i]n order to present a justiciable 
controversy in an action seeking a declaratory judgment to 
protect against a feared future event, the plaintiff must 
demonstrate that the probability of that future event occurring 
is real and substantial, 'of sufficient immediacy and reality to 
warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgement.'"  Salvation 
Army, 919 F.2d at 192 (quoting Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 
460 (1974)).  "Where the plaintiff seeks a declaratory judgment 
with respect to the constitutionality of a state statute, even 
where the attack is on First Amendment grounds, there must be a 
'real and immediate' threat of enforcement against the 
plaintiff."  Id. (quoting Hardwick v. Bowers, 760 F.2d 1202, 
1206-07 (11th Cir. 1985), rev'd on other grounds, 478 U.S. 186 
(1986)).  This threat must remain extant throughout the course of 
the litigation and "[w]here an intervening event removes these 
conditions, the court must not address the now-speculative 
controversy."  Id. (citing Steffel, 415 U.S. at 459 n.10 
(remanding for determination of whether plaintiff still faced 
threat of prosecution)). 
 
 
 In paragraph 12 of the Stewart affidavit, the state has 
forsworn enforcement of the LAD with respect to church employment 
decisions.  Stewart then states, 
 Under this provision [regarding church 
employment practices], the plaintiffs here 
are free, without fear of prosecution, to 
make employment decisions which discriminate 
respecting a current or prospective 
employee's actual or perceived sexual 
orientation.  Hence, such a "religious 
association or organization" may make 
decisions and engage in the practice of its 
sincerely-held religious beliefs within the 
limits only of the First Amendment.  The 
Division has not and has no intention of 
construing nor enforcing the LAD in any 
manner which, liberally construed, would even 
tend or threaten to violate the sincere 
"tenets" of any religion.  Moreover, the 
Division has not and has no intention to 
engage in any determination or judgment as to 
what is or is not a "religious activity" of a 
church, or to determine what is or is not a 
"tenet" of religious faith. 
 
App. at 295-96.  Although this paragraph could fairly be 
construed to remove the threat of enforcement against the church 
and its religious activities, we think it fails to eschew 
enforcement against speech or expressive conduct outside the 
setting of a religious institution or office.  Similarly, in 
paragraph 13 of his affidavit, Stewart avers that "the Division 
has not in the past prosecuted and has no intention to prosecute 
essentially exempt churches for sincerely-held religious belief 
or practice, or speech consistent with such belief, or for a 
refusal to engage in certain speech or for following their 
religious tenets, all within only the limits of the First 
 
 
Amendment."  Id. at 296 (emphasis added).  Moreover, at oral 
argument before this court, the state pointedly limited the scope 
of the immunity it offered: 
 THE COURT:  Do you agree with [plaintiffs' 
counsel's] interpretation of your affidavit? 
 
 MR. LORENTZ:  That the state has not waived 
enforcement against unnamed individuals, and 
against Reverend Cummings in his role outside 
of pastor because there's nothing in the 
complaint or anywhere in the case that 
indicates that he has any other role.  
Certainly, he is an individual. 
 
 
Tr. at 25-26.11 
 The literal terms of the DCR waiver go no farther than 
the religious activities of the institutional plaintiffs and at 
oral argument, counsel reiterated the limits of the waiver in 
                     
11.  The colloquy continues: 
 
  THE COURT:  But [appellants] argued this 
morning . . . that the title of "Reverend" in 
that [sic] complaints is only descriptive in 
that he still remains as an individual 
plaintiff.  Now is that sophistry or is there 
some merit to that? 
 
  MR. LORENTZ:  It is not our--we don't 
understand that the thrust of the attack that 
was launched on the statute originally before 
it was severely constricted was anything but 
by an institution. 
 
  Obviously, because institutional 
protection of religion is greater under the 
first amendment than it is for individuals.  
Individuals are required to obey laws of 
general application. 
 
Tr. at 26. 
 
 
this respect.  It is nevertheless also the state's position that 
the case is not ripe absent an actual prosecution.  That is not 
the law. 
 In Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452 (1974), the United 
States Supreme Court held that where a plaintiff seeks to 
exercise the First Amendment's guarantee of freedom of 
expression, the state need not prosecute in order to present a 
ripe controversy.  Id. at 459.  In Steffel, the plaintiff 
attempted to distribute handbills in a shopping center protesting 
the United States's involvement in Vietnam.  Id. at 455.  After a 
prior encounter with police, plaintiff returned with a companion.  
Id.  The police arrived and informed the protestors that if they 
remained, they would be arrested.  Id.  Plaintiff left although 
his companion stayed and was arrested.  Id. at 456.  Plaintiff 
then commenced an injunctive and declaratory action claiming the 
law interfered with his First Amendment right.  Id. at 454-55.  
The state argued the case was not ripe because there was no 
prosecution.  The Supreme Court disagreed.  "In these 
circumstances, it is not necessary that petitioner first expose 
himself to actual arrest or prosecution to be entitled to 
challenge a statute that he claims deters the exercise of his 
constitutional rights."  Id. at 459; see also McKay v. Heyison, 
614 F.2d 899, 904 (3d Cir. 1980) ("'When the plaintiff has 
alleged an intention to engage in a course of conduct, arguably 
affected with a constitutional interest, but proscribed by a 
statute, and there exists a credible threat of prosecution 
thereunder, he "should not be required to await and undergo a 
 
 
criminal prosecution as the sole means of seeking relief."'" 
(quoting Babbitt v. United Farm Workers Nat'l Union, 442 U.S. 
289, 298 (1979) (quoting Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 180 
(1973))); Chemerinsky, supra at 103 ("[I]t is well established 
that a case is ripe because of the substantial hardship to 
denying preenforcement review when a person is forced to choose 
between forgoing possibly lawful activity and risking substantial 
sanctions."). 
 We recognize that Steffel differs from the instant 
case.  There the state demonstrated its willingness to prosecute 
others.  This added immediacy to Steffel's claim that he faced 
prosecution if he engaged in proscribed expressive activity.  
Here the state has forsworn prosecution of Cummings in his 
clerical role, but it has refused to forswear his prosecution if 
he were to step off the pulpit and engage in the activities he 
alleges his first amendment right to freedom of expression 
protects.  The pointed nature of that refusal, both in the 
state's affidavit and at oral argument indicates to us that 
Reverend Cummings and others who engage in the expressive 
activity he describes face a real threat of prosecution.  In 
short, to the extent this record eliminates any free exercise 
claims as unripe it does not do so with respect to the individual 
free expression claims Cummings appears to advance.  Here, the 
state has had ample opportunity to indicate that it will not 
 
 
prosecute religiously motivated speakers under the aid and abet 
or boycott provisions.  It has elected not to do so.12 
 Accordingly, in light of the state's refusal to waive 
prosecution against Cummings when he acts outside of his 
institutional capacity as a pastor of the OPC, we conclude the 
threat of prosecution is "real and substantial," see Salvation 
Army, 919 F.2d at 192, and at least the presence of Reverend 
Cummings as a plaintiff in this law suit presents interests 
sufficiently adverse to those of the state so as to satisfy the 
first prong of the Step-Saver inquiry. 
 
 2.  Conclusiveness 
 The second Step-Saver factor requires us to determine 
whether judicial action at the present time would amount to more 
than an advisory opinion based upon a hypothetical set of facts.  
See Step-Saver, 912 F.2d at 649.  As mentioned supra, 
predominantly legal questions are generally amenable to a 
conclusive determination in a preenforcement context; however, 
"plaintiffs raising predominantly legal claims must still meet 
the minimum requirements for Article III jurisdiction."  
                     
12.  The state contends that its waiver was crafted in terms of 
the institutional plaintiffs alone because the state considered 
the plaintiffs to be litigating in their institutional capacity 
alone and that its waiver should not be read too narrowly.  The 
responses of counsel at oral argument before us, however, show 
the state still refuses to waive prosecution outside the 
religious setting once the plaintiffs made it clear that they 
sought to assert Cummings' rights as an individual.  See supra 
typescript note 10.  We have already rejected the contention 
supra typescript at 21-24 that the complaint fails to invoke the 
private rights of Reverend Cummings. 
 
 
Armstrong, 961 F.2d at 421 (citing Office of Communication of 
United Church of Christ v. FCC, 826 F.2d 101, 105 (D.C. Cir. 
1987) ("[T]he presence of 'a purely legal question' is not 
enough, of itself, to render a case ripe for judicial review, not 
even as to that issue.")). 
 In Armstrong, we approved a rationale used by the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit in 
Atlanta Gas Light Co. v. United States Department of Energy, 666 
F.2d 1359 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 836 (1982).  In 
Atlanta Gas Light, the court held that its conclusion of ripeness 
was supported by factors which included the fact that the 
parties' claims would not substantially change in future 
litigation, that the current parties were appropriate to raise 
the issues at bar and that the parties would be subject to 
enforcement of the challenged act were it implemented.  See id. 
at 1363 n.7. 
 Here, we see no reason why disposition of this case 
could not conclusively determine the largely legal issues at 
stake.  Factual development would not add much to the plaintiffs' 
facial challenges to the constitutionality of the statute.  To 
the extent that it is not distinguishable, we are unpersuaded by 
Voluntary Association of Religious Leaders v. Waihee, 800 
F. Supp. 882 (D. Haw. 1992), where the court determined that a 
challenge similar to one now before us was not factually 
developed adequately enough to make the case ripe for 
disposition.  Id. at 890.  There, the plaintiffs challenged an 
amendment to an anti-discrimination statute that added sexual 
 
 
orientation to the protected categories and made it illegal "to 
aid, abet, incite, compel, or coerce" any of the discriminatory 
practices listed by the statute.  Id. at 884.  The plaintiffs, 
who included a minister and a parishioner, "fail[ed] to allege 
that they are engaging in, or plan to engage in, any activities 
that would subject them to enforcement."  Id. at 888.  The court 
concluded that a vague allegation that a minister would preach to 
his employees about the evils of homosexuality was insufficient 
to pose any clear threat that he would be prosecuted under the 
statute.  Id. at 888-89.  To the extent, however, that the court 
concluded that a facial challenge to a statute that seeks to 
proscribe otherwise protected First Amendment conduct such as 
oral advocacy and boycott is not ripe until a concrete factual 
situation is before the court, see id. at 890, we disagree.  
Presumably, in order to give the court in Waihee a concrete 
factual situation, a prosecution would first be necessary.  We 
believe that Steffel teaches that a plaintiff need not choose 
between prosecution and stifling otherwise protected activities. 
 Furthermore, the Waihee court relied on the Supreme 
Court decision in Renne.  Id.  Renne involved a challenge to a 
California law that prohibited political parties from endorsing 
candidates for non-partisan offices.  Renne, 501 U.S. at 315.  
The Court there held that the plaintiffs' allegations that they 
sought to endorse officials in the future was insufficient to 
render the case ripe.  Id. at 321. 
 Here, unlike Renne, Cummings alleges that he currently 
engages in speech and acts allegedly circumscribed by the LAD and 
 
 
that he will continue to do so in the future.  Even if this case 
were finally dismissed as not ripe, Reverend Cummings or others 
who share his beliefs could in the future easily assert 
substantially similar facial attacks on the LAD in their 
individual capacities.  Such claims would most likely parallel 
those claims already presented in the present action, and as such 
it is unlikely that there would be any change in the substance or 
clarity of the challenges to the LAD.  Furthermore, if the LAD is 
enforced against private citizens and Reverend Cummings engages 
in the acts alleged in paragraphs 49, 51, 57, and 69 of the 
complaint, in his individual capacity, he would appear to be 
exposed to a threat of enforcement.  Reverend Cummings appears to 
be an appropriate party to raise the first amendment freedom of 
expression objections to the provisions of the LAD set out in the 
claim.  Thus, the principles discussed in Atlanta Gas Light 
support a conclusion that this case is ripe if Reverend Cummings 
has at this point expressed enough of an adverse interest to the 
provisions of the LAD he refers to in the complaint to permit 
this case to go forward. 
 Indeed, it is hard to see how a more concrete factual 
situation would aid resolution of the plaintiffs' First Amendment 
free speech challenge to the statute.  See Armstrong, 961 F.2d at 
412.  Such factual development is of minimal assistance in facial 
challenges such as this.  Present resolution of the facial 
challenge would completely and decisively determine whether the 
amendments to the LAD that the plaintiffs object to affect the 
fundamental right of free speech the First Amendment protects.  
 
 
Accordingly, we believe the second Step-Saver element also favors 
holding the controversy to be ripe. 
 
 3.  Utility 
 The final Step-Saver factor focuses on the utility 
served by current entry of a judgment resolving the facial 
challenge to the Act.  In this inquiry we consider "whether the 
parties' plans of actions are likely to be affected by a 
declaratory judgment."  Step-Saver, 912 F.2d at 649 n.9. 
 It appears to us that entry of a declaratory judgment 
deciding the free speech issues the LAD amendments pose in the 
instant case would be useful to the parties and others who could 
be affected.  Although Cummings alleges that he will engage in 
allegedly prohibited conduct in the future, we assume his 
willingness to do so is likely to be affected by resolution of 
this action.13  Similarly, the state's effort to enforce certain 
portions of the amended LAD will be affected by the resolution of 
this litigation.  Unlike the plaintiffs in Armstrong who "d[id] 
not face the threat of sanction for noncompliance with [the 
challenged act]," Cummings does.  Armstrong, 961 F.2d at 423.  A 
declaration of his rights and those of all others who would seek 
to engage in similar activity would permit a person to speak 
                     
13.  Current First Amendment jurisprudence does not require a 
Thoreau or a Gandhi who is willing to go to jail for his beliefs 
but permits the more cautious Emersons among us to assert our 
fears of interference with our this country's fundamental rights 
in the civilized atmosphere of a court before subjecting 
ourselves to the risk of arrest and jail. 
 
 
without fear of governmental sanction or regulation of their 
activities protected by the statute. 
 Accordingly, we conclude that a grant or denial of 
relief in this case would materially affect the parties and thus 
this Step-Saver factor also weighs in favor of our conclusion 
that this controversy is ripe.  We express no opinion on the 
merits of this case, a task that involves the meaning and 
interpretation of the statutory provisions under attack and their 
effect on our fundamental constitutional right to freedom of 
speech.  We think that task should be performed by the district 
court in the first instance. 
 We therefore conclude that Reverend Cummings has 
demonstrated a ripe controversy under the three factor test set 
forth in Step-Saver.  Because the state's representation 
regarding enforcement does not eliminate the threat of 
enforcement against plaintiff Cummings and Cummings has averred 
that he does and will engage in potentially violative conduct, 
the parties present adverse interests in this dispute.  Moreover, 
a final resolution of this dispute would be both conclusive on 
the issue and of practical help to those who seek to engage in 
potentially protected activity.  We hold, therefore, that the 
district court erred in dismissing the action as unripe.14 
                     
14.  Our reasons for so concluding also establish Cummings' 
standing to assert a violation of his First Amendment rights.  In 
order for a party to present a justiciable controversy, the 
litigant must be "entitled to have the court decide the merits of 
the dispute or of particular issues."  Warth v. Selden, 422 U.S. 
490, 498 (1975).  At a constitutional minimum, the litigant 






 must demonstrate three things:  (1) "injury 
in fact," by which we mean an invasion of a 
legally protected interest that is "(a) 
concrete and particularized, and (b) actual 
or imminent, not conjectural or 
hypothetical"[;] (2) a causal relationship 
between the injury and the challenged 
conduct, by which we mean that the injury 
"fairly can be traced to the challenged 
action of the defendant," and has not 
resulted "from the independent action of some 
third party not before the court"[;] and (3) 
a likelihood that the injury will be 
redressed by a favorable decision, by which 
we mean that the "prospect of obtaining 
relief from the injury as a result of a 
favorable ruling" is not "too speculative[.]" 
 
Northeastern Fla. Chapter of Assoc. Gen. Contractors of Am. v. 
City of Jacksonville, 113 S. Ct. 2297, 2301-02 (1993).  It is 
clear that Cummings can assert his own rights as an individual 
and, in light of our conclusion that the state has not foregone 
the threat of prosecuting Cummings for what he claims are the 
expressive activities he wishes to engage in as a citizen, we 
conclude Cummings has standing without reference to the 
plaintiff's standing to assert the First Amendment rights of 
others whose expressive activities may be chilled by the threat 




 For the foregoing reasons, we will reverse the order of 
the district court dismissing Reverend Cummings first amendment 
freedom of expression claims for lack of jurisdiction and remand 
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.  The 
state's representations clearly show that the claims of the 
institutional plaintiffs, Presbytery and Calvary are not ripe.  
Stewart, the Director of the Division on Civil Rights in the 
Department of Law and Public Safety of the State of New Jersey 
and an officer of the court swears:  "[the State] . . . has no 
intention to prosecute essentially exempt churches for sincerely-
held religious belief or practice, or speech consistent with such 
belief . . . .  [T]his would include N.J.S.A. 10:5-12c, N.J.S.A. 
10:5-12e, N.J.S.A. 10:5-12j, N.J.S.A. 10:5-12 l and N.J.S.A. 
10:5-12m."  App. at 296-97.  Therefore, we will affirm the 
district court's decision as it applies to the institutional 
plaintiffs. 
RE:  THE PRESBYTERY OF NEW JERSEY OF THE ORTHODOX PRESBYTERIAN 
     CHURCH, et al., Appellants v. JAMES FLORIO, GOVERNOR OF 
     NEW JERSEY, et al., No. 93-5559 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
ROSENN, Circuit Judge, dissenting. 
 The majority correctly concludes that this suit is not 
ripe with respect to the institutional parties.  However, I 
disagree with the majority's conclusion that "the controversy is 
ripe" because Rev. David Cummings arguably alleges as an 
individual that the statute threatens his right of speech.  This 
conclusion ignores completely the allegations in the complaint 
that he is suing as the pastor of the Orthodox Presbyterian 
Church of New Jersey.  I therefore respectfully dissent because I 
believe this case is not ripe for judicial disposition.   
 Article III, section 2 of the United States 
Constitution limits federal jurisdiction to actual "cases" and 
"controversies." U.S. Const. art III § 2.  Thus, it forbids the 
issuance of advisory opinions.  "The case or controversy 
requirement must be met regardless of the type of relief sought, 
including declaratory relief." Armstrong World Indus., Inc. v. 
Adams, 961 F.2d 405, 410 (3d Cir. 1992) (citation omitted).  
Additionally, "even if a declaratory judgment would clarify the 
parties' legal rights, it should ordinarily not be granted unless 
`the parties' plans of actions are likely to be affected by a 
declaratory judgment.'" Id. at 412 (citation omitted).  Also, in 
cases concerning the Constitutionality of state statutes, this 
 
 
court should consider "the advantage of permitting state courts 
further opportunity to construe the challenged provision and 
perhaps in the process materially alter the question to be 
decided." Id. (citation omitted) (quotation  
omitted).  Finally, this court must presume that it lacks 
jurisdiction unless the record affirmatively demonstrates that 
jurisdiction exists; i.e. the plaintiff must persuade this court 
that jurisdiction exists. Renne v. Geary, 501 U.S. 312, 316 
(1991). 
 Federal courts consider three primary factors when 
reviewing a declaratory judgment action for ripeness:  (1) 
adversity of interest between plaintiffs and defendants, (2) 
conclusivity, and (3) utility.  Step-Saver Data Systems, Inc. v. 
Wyse Technology, 912 F.2d 643, 647 (3d Cir. 1990).15  The court 
weighs these and other relevant factors to determine if the issue 
is ripe.  Here, the case is not ripe because no adversity of 
interest exists between the parties involved in this suit in 
light of the extensive protection afforded by New Jersey's Law 
Against Discrimination (LAD) from interference with plaintiffs' 
religious practices.  Moreover, the Director of New Jersey's 
Division on Civil Rights has represented that the State has not 
in the past prosecuted and has no intention to prosecute exempt 
religious organizations for religious beliefs, practices, or 
                     
15.  See, majority opinion at 14-19 for a thorough and 
informative discussion of ripeness jurisprudence. 
 
 
speech.  Therefore, the conclusiveness and utility of a judgment 
rendered at this time are doubtful. 
 The majority correctly notes that the State of New 
Jersey has expressed its intention not to prosecute Rev. Cummings 
for actions taken as a member of the clergy engaging in the 
performance of religious functions and that the State has refused 
to waive enforcement of LAD against Cummings as an individual.  
The majority properly concludes that Cummings cannot pursue this 
suit as a representative of the church.  The majority, however, 
strains in an effort to conclude that Cummings has sued in his 
individual capacity and in that capacity can pursue this case. 
 Cummings is clearly identified in the complaint as 
"Rev. David B. Cummings." see e.g., plaintiffs' caption in First 
Amended Complaint and ¶¶ 1 and 4.  The complaint does not allege 
that he sues in a secular capacity as an individual church 
member.  Moreover, when this court heard an earlier appeal in 
this same case on an appeal from an order denying the plaintiffs' 
application for a preliminary injunction, its memorandum opinion 
addressed Cummings only in his role as "an ordained minister of 
the Presbytery and the pastor of one of its member churches." In 
that appeal, appellants did not maintain that Cummings was acting 
as an individual and appellants have never amended their 
complaint to include Cummings or others as individual plaintiffs.  
Paragraph 4 of the complaint in this case specifically avers:  
"plaintiff, Rev. David B. Cummings, is an ordained minister of 
 
 
the Presbytery, and the pastor of one of its New Jersey 
churches."  No reference is made to him as an individual.  If any 
residual question still remains at this point as to Cummings' 
status in this litigation, it is dissipated by paragraph 45 of 
the complaint.  It states:  "[t]he individual plaintiff 
[Cummings] is an agent of these entities [the churches]." 
 The majority does not point to any  language that 
describes Cummings as an individual.16  In fact, the first of the 
three paragraphs from the complaint quoted by the majority in 
support of their conclusion begins "[p]laintiff Cummings, other 
pastors and members of their congregations . . . ."  ¶ 51 of 
complaint (emphasis added).  The plaintiffs' use of the words 
"other pastors" immediately after "plaintiff Cummings" confirms 
that Cummings is acting as a pastor in this litigation and not as 
an individual.  The additional paragraphs from the complaint 
quoted by the majority contain references to actions by 
"plaintiffs" without providing any evidence that the referenced 
"plaintiffs" include any individuals.   
 The district court observed that the individual members 
of the appellant churches were not plaintiffs in this action. 
Presbytery of N.J. of Orthodox Presbyterian Church v. Florio, 830 
F.Supp 241, 249 (D.N.J. 1993).  The record supports this 
observation.  First, the complaint's caption lists only one 
                     
16.  Interestingly, of the three paragraphs quoted by the 
majority, Cummings only adopts paragraph 53 in his Affidavit in 
support of the complaint. 
 
 
individual, Reverend Cummings.17  Second, the record contains no 
information demonstrating that any of the church members are 
represented by the named plaintiffs or have consented to 
inclusion in this law suit.18  The district court properly noted 
that a ripe declaratory judgment action requires "a `real and 
immediate' threat of enforcement against the plaintiff." 830 
F.Supp at 249 (quoting Salvation Army v. Department of Community 
Affairs, 919 F.2d 183, 192 (3d Cir. 1990) (emphasis added by 
district court).  Cummings brought this suit as an institutional 
representative.  After the State's affidavit averred that it 
would not prosecute him under LAD for actions taken as a pastor, 
no legitimate case or controversy remained. 
 Even if Cummings had pursued this case as an individual 
from the beginning, it is not ripe.  "Where the plaintiff seeks a 
declaratory judgment with respect to the constitutionality of a 
state statute, even where the attack is on First Amendment 
grounds, there must be a `real and immediate' threat of 
                     
17.  I do not agree with the majority's supposition that 
"Reverend" is used as a purely honorary term.  In the context of 
this litigation, where the plaintiffs have carefully shielded 
Cummings from the possibility of counter-claims and the 
assessment of costs, "Reverend" is used precisely; it signifies 
Cummings' role as an institutional representative and separates 
Cummings the church representative, the plaintiff in this case, 
from Cummings the individual. 
18.  On appeal, appellant contends that they are acting on behalf 
of their church members.  However, they have provided no 
persuasive evidence to support this contention; mere references 




enforcement."  Salvation Army, 919 F.2d at 192 (quoting Hardwick 
v. Bowers, 760 F.2d 1202, 1206-7 (11th Cir. 1985)).  Nothing in 
the record demonstrates any realistic threat that the state will 
enforce the amendments against Cummings as an individual.  The 
State has merely refused to waive its right to prosecute 
Cummings; it has not taken any steps to prosecute him or anyone 
else under LAD.  In a careful analysis, the able and experienced 
district judge noted that "[t]he plaintiffs' professed fears of 
state enforcement of the LAD against their members appear to be 
based only on imagination or speculation, which is insufficient 
to create a ripe controversy." 830 F.Supp at 249 (citation 
omitted). 
 Despite the State's refusal to waive enforcement of the 
LAD against Cummings and other members of the congregation as 
individuals, the record supports the district court's finding 
that there is no realistic threat that the State will enforce the 
law against them.  In the almost two years since the LAD became 
effective, neither the State nor any private individual has filed 
a complaint against a church member.  Moreover, the district 
court found that the threat of an administrative or private suit 
has not had any discernible effect on their conduct.  830 F.Supp 
at 249.  To the contrary, the plaintiffs concede that since the 
enactment of the LAD in 1992, they have discriminated and spoken 
out against people based on their sexual orientation.  The court 
thus found that the prospect that the plaintiffs will alter their 
 
 
actions out of fear of a suit under the LAD is highly unlikely. 
830 F.Supp at 249. See Salvation Army, 919 F.2d at 193. 
 The plaintiffs have not demonstrated a real and 
substantial probability that the litigation they fear will occur; 
almost two years have passed since the LAD became effective and 
no private suit or administrative complaint has been filed.  See 
Armstrong, 961 F.2d at 412.  Additionally, the district court 
found that there is "no credible evidence that any person or 
organization is contemplating such an action." 830 F.Supp at 249.  
The theoretical possibility that someone may file such a suit at 
some time in the future is not sufficient to render this action 
ripe.  See Salvation Army, 919 F.2d at 193.  Moreover, this court 
has noted that the relief the plaintiffs seek would not bind 
unidentified private parties and protect plaintiffs from private 
suits.  
 In addition to showing that the issues in this case are 
not fit for judicial decision, the record also shows that the 
withholding of an opinion at this time will not work a hardship 
on the parties.  Despite the plaintiffs' arguments to the 
contrary, they will suffer no "immediate and significant" 
hardship from the district court's decision not to adjudicate 
this action at this time.  See Felmeister v. Office of Attorney 
Ethics, Div. of New Jersey Administrative Office of Courts, 856 
F.2d 529, 537 (3d Cir. 1988).  The court found that the 
plaintiffs have not changed their behavior due to the LAD 
 
 
amendments, that defendants will not subject the plaintiffs to an 
enforcement action, and that private enforcement of the statute 
against the plaintiffs is uncertain.  Thus, the court did not err 
in concluding that its withholding of an opinion will not work a 
hardship on the plaintiffs. 
 Regardless how one views the merits of the amendments 
to the LAD, there is no reason whatsoever why this court should 
struggle to construct a theoretical controversy where none 
exists.  Under the three Step-Saver factors, this case is not 
ripe for resolution.  Therefore, I would affirm the order of the 
district court dismissing plaintiffs' action. 
